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Appraising Valence
‘Valence’ is used in many different ways in emotion theory. It generally refers to
the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of an emotion, as well as to the ‘positive’ or
‘negative’ character of some aspect of emotion. After reviewing these different
uses, I point to the conceptual problems that come with them. In particular, I dis-
tinguish: problems that arise from conflating the valence of an emotion with the
valence of its aspects, and problems that arise from the very idea that an emotion
(and/or its aspects) can be divided into mutually exclusive opposites. The first
group of problems does not question the classic dichotomous notion of valence,
but the second does. In order to do justice to the richness of daily emotions, emo-
tion science needs more complex conceptual tools.
I: Introduction
With the term ‘valence’ emotion theorists usually refer to the ‘positive’ and
‘negative’ character of an emotion and/or of its aspects (such as behaviour,
affect, evaluation, faces, adaptive value, etc.). The English word ‘valence’ was
introduced in psychology in the 1930s, but not immediately within emotion the-
ory. Similarly, the expression ‘positive and negative emotions’ started to
become scientifically regimented around those years. Since then, the two expres-
sions have gradually come together, and they are now reciprocally supporting
and mutually defining conceptual tools of contemporary emotion science.
In this paper I do two things. In the first part (sections II to V) I show that the
term ‘valence’ has been used in more than a half-dozen different ways since its
appearance in psychology and emotion theory, and I review and illustrate these
uses in detail. In the second part (section VI) I highlight the problems that, in my
view, go along with such uses. I distinguish problems that have to do with con-
flating different uses of the notion of valence, and problems that depend on the
idea that emotions and/or their aspects can be dichotomized. I conclude the dis-
cussion with an assessment of the utility of the notion of valence in emotion
theory (section VII).
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12, No. 8–10, 2005, pp. 103–26
Correspondence:
Giovanna Colombetti, Laboratorio di Scienze Cognitive, Università degli Studi di Trento, via
Tartarotti, 7, 38068 Rovereto, Italy. Email: colombetti@form.unitn.it
The first part of the paper is independent of whether one agrees with the dis-
cussion in the second part; it is, I hope, useful in itself. The process that has led
‘valence’ to refer to the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ character of emotion and/or its
aspects is subtle. Often the terms ‘valence,’ ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ appear
without prior definition, on the assumption that their meaning is clear and uncon-
troversial. Yet what is ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ depends on one’s concerns. This
lack of explicitness has accumulated over the years, leading to a bundle of
cross-definitions and cross-characterizations. Different meanings of ‘valence’
often inadvertently crop up and influence one’s theory; the less aware one is of
such different meanings, the more likely one is to assume and conflate them
when using the word – hence the present overview.
The second part is more argumentative and builds on recent philosophical dis-
cussions of the notion of valence (Charland, 2005a; Prinz, 2004; Solomon &
Stone, 2002). As I see it, some of the problems raised by the current uses of this
notion do not question the idea that emotions have a positive or negative charac-
ter; they just call for more terminological awareness and explicitness. Other
problems, however, depend on the very idea that emotions and their aspects can
be dichotomized. These problems highlight the inappropriateness of the notion
of valence, and raise the question of whether this notion can be enriched, or
whether it should rather be rejected.
II: From Chemistry to Psychology
The etymology of ‘valence’ does not refer to any polarity. The term comes from
the Latin noun valentia, which means ‘power, competence’ (from the verb valeo,
‘I am strong’ or ‘I am well’). In Italian, for example, the word valenza has kept
this meaning and is used to refer to the significance or value of a situation.1
The English word ‘valence’ (or ‘valency’), as well as the equivalent in other
languages (valence, valenza, valentia, etc.), is also used in chemistry. Atoms
have ‘valence electrons’ in their high energy levels, and these electrons are
shared in the formation of compounds. Simply put, atoms with one or two
valence electrons are unstable and tend to stabilize by forming compounds,
whereas atoms with eight valence electrons are very stable. Atomic valence is
expressed by a positive integer (1 to 8), and is thus neither positive nor negative.
What is ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ is the charge of atomic components, such as
electrons (negative charges) and protons (positive charges). Also, some elements
attract valence electrons and as a consequence their overall charge becomes neg-
ative; other elements give up some of their valence electrons and their overall
charge becomes positive.
When the English term ‘valence’ first appeared in psychology, it was used
mainly as a synonym of ‘charge.’ Tolman (1932) proposed ‘valence’ as a transla-
tion of the German word Aufforderungscharakter as it appears in the works of
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[1] For example: ‘Il Grido’ di Edward Munch ha una forte valenza emotiva = Edward Munch’s ‘The
Scream’ has a strong emotional valence. Or: La valenza politica di un incontro = The political
valence of a meeting.
Kurt Lewin. In illustrating both Lewin’s and his own ideas, Tolman claimed that
thanks to their ‘“invitation-characters” or “valencies” (Aufforderungs-
charaktere)’ objects exert ‘attracting or repulsive forces,’ which are ‘stresses
and strains which finally resolve themselves by causing such and such directions
and turnings of behavior’ (Tolman, 1932, p. 179). Lewin similarly defined
Aufforderungscharaktere as ‘imperative environmental facts’ that ‘determine
the direction of the behaviour’ (Lewin, 1935, p. 77). Aufforderungscharaktere
can be either positive or negative. The positive ones effect approach, whereas the
negative ones produce withdrawal or retreats (ibid., p. 81). Notice the comment
of Lewin’s translators on the decision to use ‘valence’:
There is no good English equivalent for Aufforderungscharakter as the author uses
it. ‘Positive Aufforderungscharaktere’ and ‘negative Aufforderungscharaktere’
might be accurately rendered by ‘attractive characters’ and ‘repulsive characters,’
were it not desirable, for various reasons, to have a neutral term. Perhaps the most
nearly accurate translation for the expression would be ‘compulsive character,’ but
that is cumbrous and a shade too strong. In consultation with the author it has been
decided to do a very little violence to an old use of the word ‘valence’ (see the New
English Dictionary). It should be noted that, in contrast to chemical valence, which
is only positive, psychological valence or a psychological valence may be either
positive (attracting) or negative (repelling), and that an object or activity loses or
acquires valence … in accordance with the needs of the organism. [Translators’
note]. (in Lewin, 1935, p. 77)
Auffordern in German means to invite one to do something; Aufforderungs-
charakter thus refers to the property of inviting one to an action. An accurate
translation would be ‘affordance-character’, where the term ‘affordance’ is bor-
rowed from ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979) and refers to properties of the
environment that afford or invite a certain behaviour toward it (for example, a
chair affords a behaviour of sitting onto it).
What is interesting, ultimately, is that ‘valence’ entered Anglophone psychol-
ogy via a questionable translation, and initially referred to affordance-characters
rather than emotions. This use of ‘valence’, however, was not unambiguous and
it contained the seeds of subsequent uses of the term, including its relation to
emotion. First, in Lewin an affordance-character is not only a charge that induces
an agent to physically approach or withdraw an object:
We may at this point remark a circumstance of general importance: direction in the
psychobiological field is not necessarily to be identified with physical direction, but
must be defined primarily in psychological terms. … When the child fetches a tool
or applies to the experimenter for help, the action does not mean, even when it
involves a physical movement in a direction opposite to the goal, a turning away
from the goal but an approach to it. (1935, p. 84)
In this passage Lewin understands approach as involving an action toward a
goal-state, irrespective of the movement’s direction. This conception opens up
the question of what approach and withdrawal are. As we shall see, behaviourists
and cognitivists will answer differently, and thus use ‘valence’ in different ways.
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Second, in Lewin the sign of an affordance-character often depends on the
experience that it induces. In many of his examples, positive (negative, respec-
tively) affordance-characters are accompanied by pleasant (unpleasant) feelings.
A child who has to choose between going to a picnic or playing with his friends
stands between two positive valences; a child who wants to climb a tree but is
afraid of it faces something that has simultaneously a positive and a negative
valence; etc. (cf. Lewin, 1935, p. 89). Here the character of experience tacitly
determines the sign of the affordance-characters. As we shall see, this happens fre-
quently in emotion theory. ‘Valence’ is now often used to refer to how good and
bad an emotion feels; yet it often refers, at the same time, to phenomena (behav-
iours, goals, evaluations, etc.) tacitly assumed to feel intrinsically good or bad.
III: Object Valence, Behaviour Valence, and Emotion Valence
Charland (2005a; 2005b, this volume) has introduced a useful distinction
between emotion valence and affect valence. ‘Emotion valence’ refers to the pos-
itive and negative character of an emotion tout court (the positive or negative
character of fear, anger, joy, etc.), whereas ‘affect valence’ refers to the positive
and negative character of emotion experience (how good or bad an emotion
feels). In this and the following section I will adopt Charland’s distinction, and I
will enrich it by individuating more uses of ‘valence’.
Tolman’s and Lewin’s notion of valence refers to the positive or negative
charge of objects in the environment — let us then call it object valence. As we
saw, Tolman and Lewin did not use ‘valence’ to refer to emotion. Yet current
emotion theories often posit a link between object valence and emotion valence.
Positive or negative emotions are said to be elicited, for example, by positive or
negative environmental contingencies, stimuli, pictures, words (Cacioppo &
Berntson, 1994), events (Bradley & Lang, 2000), film clips (Davidson, 1998),
images, pictures and percepts (Lang et al., 2000). The International Affective
Picture System (IAPS, cf. Lang et al., 1995) consists in a set of positive, negative
and neutral pictures, aimed at eliciting emotions with the corresponding valence
sign (positive pictures include happy babies, appetising food and erotica; nega-
tive ones include poisonous snakes, aimed guns and violent deaths; neutral ones
involve people doing routine tasks, rental places and common household
objects).
Frijda (1986) also uses ‘valence’ as object valence: ‘[e]vents, objects, and sit-
uations may possess positive and negative valence; that is, they may possess
intrinsic attractiveness or aversiveness’ (p. 207). Valence is for Frijda one of ten
other components of what he calls ‘situational meaning structure’ — a set of
environmental properties that define the meaning of a situation which, in turn,
determines the occurrence of emotions. Other components of situational mean-
ing structure are difficulty, urgency, seriousness, clarity, etc. (pp. 204–9);
together with valence, they determine behaviour and experience. Note that on
this view object valence does not directly determine emotion valence (indeed, in
1986 Frijda did not even mention ‘positive and negative emotions’).
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Another early use of the term ‘valence’ is in Schneirla (1959, table on p. 30),
where it refers to the direction of behaviour — let us call this behaviour valence.
‘Positive valence’ refers to approach, retaining, tolerance and acquisition; ‘nega-
tive valence’ refers to withdrawal, escape, refusal and aggression. Like object
valence, behaviour valence was not initially used within emotion theory. At
present, however, many emotion theorists relate behaviour valence and emotion
valence. For example, Davidson uses ‘valence’ primarily to refer to approach
and withdrawal, and is interested in how different brain hemispheres contribute
to it. He has presented evidence that approach depends on increased activation in
left prefrontal cortical regions, whereas withdrawal depends on increased activa-
tion in right prefrontal cortical ones (e.g. Davidson, 1993). In addition (and
unlike Schneirla), Davidson also uses behaviour valence to determine emotion
valence; he defines a positive emotion as involving approach, and a negative
emotion as involving withdrawal.
It is interesting that authors who initially used ‘valence’ did not use ‘positive
and negative emotions’ and also vice-versa (table 1). Arnold & Gasson (1954, p.
206) and Arnold (1960, p. 195), for example, defined positive (negative) emo-
tions in relation to behaviours toward (against) beneficial (harmful) objects, but
they never used the term ‘valence.’
Authors Use ‘valence’ as object or behaviour
valence
Use ‘positive and negative emotions’
Tolman (1932) Yes, as object valence:
positive (negative) valence refers to
attractive (aversive) stimuli.
No
Lewin (1935) “ “
Arnold & Gasson
(1954)
No Yes. Positive (negative) emotions are
elicited by suitable (harmful) objects
Schneirla (1959) Yes, as behaviour valence:
positive (negative) valence refers to
approach (withdrawal) behaviour
No
Arnold (1960) No Yes. Positive (negative) emotions
involve behaviour toward (away from)
objects
Frijda (1986) Yes, as object valence:
positive (negative) valence is
attractiveness (aversiveness) in objects
No
Davidson (1993) Yes, as behaviour valence:
positive (negative) valence refers to
approach (withdrawal) behaviour
Yes. Positive (negative) emotions
involve approach (withdrawal)
Cacioppo &
Bernston (1994)
Yes, as object valence:
The positive (negative) valence of
pictures and other stimuli
Yes
Lang et al (2000) Yes, as object valence:
The positive (negative) valence of
pictures, images and percepts
Yes
Table 1. Early uses of ‘valence’ as object valence and behaviour valence,
and some more recent ones. The table also indicates early definitions of
‘positive and negative emotions’ in relation to objects and behaviour.
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IV: Affect valence
At present, valence is often used as affect valence (Charland, 2005a; 2005b, this
volume) — it refers to how good or bad an emotion experience, or affect, feels.
Psychologists have discussed the hedonic tone of emotions — their pleasant or
unpleasant feel — since Wundt’s (1907) and Titchener’s (1908) debate on feelings
and bodily sensations (reflections on hedonic tone appeared much earlier, of
course). Since then, so-called ‘dimensional approaches’ (e.g. Block, 1957; Russell
& Mehrabian, 1977; Russell, 1980) have always posited pleasantness-unpleasant-
ness as a fundamental dimension of emotion experience.2 This dimension has
gradually become ‘the valence dimension’.3 In this approach, hedonic tone and
valence are synonyms. A different approach posits positive affect (PA) and nega-
tive affect (NA) as two separate unipolar dimensions (Bradburn, 1969). Here posi-
tive and negative affect do not coincide with pleasantness and unpleasantness, and
there is no hedonic/valence dimension. For example, for Watson & Tellegen
(1985) and Watson et al. (1988), pleasantness depends on high PA and low NA,
and unpleasantness depends on low PA and high NA.4
In the first approach, valence is the positive-negative dimension of experience
and is distinct from the dimension of arousal (or activation), and sometimes from
a third or even fourth dimension. In other cases, ‘valence’ refers to the positive-
negative character of all dimensions of emotion experience that one individu-
ates. For example, according to Davitz (1969) emotion experience has four
dimensions — hedonic tone, direction of behaviour, activation and competence
(how good or bad one feels one is at something) — and they are all valenced.
Valence cannot be decoupled from these dimensions; it is intrinsic in all of them.
Theories of affect valence differ in how they explain why an affective state
feels good or bad. For Damasio (2003), for example, the valence of feelings
depends on how easy and free-flowing organismic processes are. When organis-
mic processes are optimal and non-obstructed, the accompanying feelings are
positive; vice-versa, when the organism is impeded in its activity and mainte-
nance of well-being and balance, the accompanying feelings are negative.
According to Davidson (e.g. 1984), the behaviour of approach (withdrawal) is
intrinsically pleasant (unpleasant); approach and approach-related positive
affect depend on the left hemisphere (also responsible for fine motor control; cf.
Davidson, 1984), whereas withdrawal and withdrawal-related negative affect
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[2] These approaches developed after the so-called semantic differential (Osgood, 1952), originally
developed to capture ‘the dimensions of meaning’ — the dimensions underlying ‘something basic to
the structuring of human judgments’ (Osgood & Suci, 1955, p. 337). Osgood and colleagues individ-
uated three such dimensions: 1) activity (as in sharp-dull, active-passive, fast-slow); 2) potency (as in
strong-weak, large-small, heavy-light, hard-soft), and 3) evaluation (as in beautiful-ugly, nice-awful,
clean-dirty, pleasant-unpleasant, delicate-rugged). The idea that meaning and experience have
dimensions comes in turn from attempts to understand synesthesia (in particular whether synesthesia
involves the ‘parallel alignment’ of two or more experiences).
[3] For example, Russell (1980) does not mention valence, but Russell & Carroll (1999) and Russell
(2003) do.
[4] See Russell & Carroll (1999) for an overview of the debate between bipolar and unipolar theories, and
for a defence of the former.
depend on the right hemisphere (responsible for gross withdrawal reactions). For
Lambie & Marcel (2002) emotion experience depends on first-order irreflexive
phenomenal experience, as well as on second-order reflexive awareness. On
their view, hedonic tone can change according to attentional mode (for example,
it might disappear if one attends to one’s bodily sensations and feelings in a suf-
ficiently analytic and detached manner). Drawing on this account, Charland
(2005a) has proposed an explicitly ‘non-intrinsic view’ of affect valence,
according to which affect valence is always constructed through the interplay of
first- and second-order processes; in Charland’s words, affect valence is
indeterminate.
Although affect valence is often discussed per se within phenomenological
analyses of emotion experience, it also often contributes more or less explicitly
to other uses of valence. When emotions are called ‘positive and negative’ with-
out explanation, the most plausible understanding of the expression is usually in
terms of ‘good and bad feelings.’ Similarly, object valence, behaviour valence,
and other uses of ‘valence’ (see next section) are often parasitic on affect
valence. Table 2 lists (some of) the authors who currently use ‘valence’ to refer
to emotion experience (pleasantness-unpleasantness, and/or positive and nega-
tive affect and/or feelings). It also indicates those who use affect valence to char-
acterize emotion valence (caveat: it is not always easy to attribute these uses, so
the list is not comprehensive and might not reflect the author’s intentions).
Authors who use ‘valence’ as affect valence Use affect valence to define emotion valence
(positive emotions feel good,
negative emotions feel bad)
Davitz (1969) Yes
Tucker (1981) No
Lang (1984; 1985) No
Davidson (1984; 2000) Yes
Panksepp (1998) In part (see section V)
Russell & Carroll (1999) No
Isen (2000) Yes
Lambie & Marcel (2002) No
Rozin (2003) No
Damasio (2003) Yes
Varela & Depraz (2005, this volume) No
Table 2. Some authors who use valence as affect valence; and, among them,
those who use affect valence to define emotion valence
V: More Valenced Phenomena, and their Relation to Emotion Valence
Other aspects of emotion are called ‘valenced.’ These uses further cross-define
and complicate the notion of valence and its relation to emotion.
APPRAISING VALENCE 109
The valence of facial expressions
The ‘valence’ of a facial expression usually refers to the positive and negative
character of the experience that the face (allegedly) expresses. What is called
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ in a face however varies according to how one views
the relation between facial display and experience. It is useful to distinguish
three such views:5
(1) The purely categorical approach, according to which there is a number of
basic emotions expressed by typical faces. What is ‘valenced,’ in this view, is the
whole face (Tomkins, 1962/1963, 1970; Ekman, 1999).
(2) The componential approach, according to which facial expressions have
meaningful components, and one component can appear in the expression of dif-
ferent emotions. In general, eyebrow frown (produced by contracting the corru-
gator supercilii) is associated with unpleasant experiences, and raised lip corners
(produced by contracting the zygomatic major) is associated with pleasant ones.
Reinman et al. (2000) say that zygomatic muscle activity is a measure of positive
emotion, whereas corrugator muscle activity is a measure of negative emotion.
What is ‘valenced’ here are individual components, and they ‘valence’ the
emotion expressed by the whole face.
(3) The dimensional approach, according to which facial expressions of emo-
tion are organized along a few dimensions. Schlosberg (1941; 1952; 1954) distin-
guished facial expressions initially according to two dimensions (pleasantness-
unpleasantness and attention-rejection) and then three (adding the level of activa-
tion). As in dimensional accounts of emotion experience, ‘valence’ here corre-
sponds to the pleasantness-unpleasantness dimension.
For Davidson (e.g. 1984) facial expressions are not only an index of affect
valence, but also of emotion and behaviour valence. In his view, positive facial
expressions depend on neural structures in the left hemisphere that are impli-
cated in positive emotions — namely, approach-involving emotions and associ-
ated positive affects; and negative facial expressions depend on neural structures
in the right hemisphere that are implicated in negative emotions — namely,
withdrawal-involving emotions and associated negative affects.
Authors who mention positive
and negative facial expressions
Relation of facial valence to affect and/or emotion valence
Tomkins (1962/1963) Faces express negative or positive affect
Ekman (1972; 1999) Positive (negative) facial expressions express positive (negative)
affects
Davidson (1984) Positive (negative) facial expressions involve the same neural
structures as positive (negative) emotions
Watson & Tellegen (1985) Positive (negative) facial expressions express positive (negative)
affects
Reinman et al. (2000) Zygomatic (corrugator) activity indicates positive (negative) emotion
Table 3. Uses of ‘facial valence’ and their relation to emotion and/or affect valence
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[5] Here I follow, in part, Smith & Scott (1997).
Evaluation valence
Emotion valence sometimes depends on evaluation valence – the positive or
negative character of eliciting evaluations. For Ben-Ze’ev (2000) positive and
negative emotions are elicited by positive and negative evaluations; a positive
(negative) evaluation is an evaluation of something as good (bad).
Schadenfreude is thus positive because it is elicited by a positive evaluation —
that is, an evaluation of someone else’s misfortunes as good. Similarly, compas-
sion and sympathy are negative, because they are based on the evaluation of
one’s condition as bad. Ortony et al. (1988, p. 13) similarly define emotions as
‘valenced reactions to events, agent, or objects, with their particular nature being
determined by the way in which the eliciting situation is construed.’ In their the-
ory all emotions are elicited by an evaluation. Exactly which emotion an agent
will have depends specifically on whether the evaluation is about events, actions
or objects; whether these are evaluated as good or bad; and whether they are
evaluated with respect to their consequences for the self or for other people. For
example, A’s pity for B is elicited by A’s evaluation of an event as thwarting B’s
goals (negative valence); A’s shame is elicited by A’s evaluation of A’s action as
blameworthy (negative valence); and A’s love for X is elicited by A’s evaluation
of X as suitable (positive valence). Emotion valence here depends on evaluation
valence, and what makes an evaluation ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ depends on
whether an event is evaluated as ‘good’ or ‘bad.’
According to Lazarus (1991), a positive (negative) emotion is an emotion elic-
ited by the evaluation that the person-environment relationship caused by the
emotion is beneficial (harmful). This definition makes pity, compassion and
sympathy ‘positive.’ Finally, Lambie & Marcel (2002, p. 243) mention ‘positive
and negative evaluations’ as a factor that influences emotion experience. They
do not specify what makes an evaluation positive or negative in the first place,
but it is clear that, on their view, evaluations are ‘valenced contents of emotion
experience,’ together with other valenced phenomena.
Authors who use valence as
evaluation valence
Relation of evaluation valence to emotion and/or affect valence
Ortony et al. (1988) Positive (negative) emotions are elicited by evaluations of events,
objects and actions as good (bad)
Lazarus (1991) Positive (negative) emotions are elicited by the evaluation of the
emotion as socially beneficial (harmful)
Ben Ze’ev (2000) Positive (negative) emotions are elicited by positive (negative)
evaluations
Lambie & Marcel (2002) Evaluation valence is part of the content of emotion experience
Table 4. Uses of evaluation valence and their relation to emotion and/or affect valence
Teleological uses of valence
In artificial intelligence (AI) positive and negative emotions are often defined in
relation to goals. For Dyer (1987) positive emotions involve the attainment of a
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goal, and negative emotions involve the thwarting of a goal. Specific emotions
differ according to how goals are attained and thwarted; whereas sadness can be
seen as depending on one’s goals being thwarted in general, anger depends on
the presence of someone or something thwarting one’s goals. According to this
approach, most emotions can be called positive and negative only a posteriori –
after a certain goal has been attained or thwarted. I call this the teleological use of
valence, because it defines the positive or negative character of one’s emotions
according to the consequences of one’s actions with respect to one’s goals, needs
or desires.
Izard (1991) chooses to define positive (negative) emotions according to
whether their consequences are desirable (undesirable). Other views of valence
do not explicitly mention goals and desires, but can nevertheless be seen as teleo-
logical because they define positive and negative emotions with respect to future
states considered desirable or undesirable. For example, as we saw, Lazarus
(1991) claims that positive (negative) emotions are elicited by the appraisal of a
situation as having beneficial (harmful) social consequences. Bickhard (2000)
characterizes positive emotions as diminishing uncertainty, and negative emo-
tions as augmenting it (these examples also show that the teleological use of
valence can overlap with evaluation valence). Another teleological use of
‘valence’ is in Rozin (2003): ‘[a] positive state is one that we seek or try to main-
tain or enhance, and a negative state is one that we seek to reduce, eliminate or
avoid’ (p. 840). Likewise, for Prinz (2004) ‘[p]ositive emotions are ones we
want to sustain, and negative emotions are ones that we want to get rid of’
(p. 174); valence in his view corresponds to inner positive and negative reinforc-
ers — brain systems that make us persist in rewarding behaviours, and cease
non-rewarding or punishing ones.
Authors who
use valence
teleologically
Relation of teleologically-used valence to emotion valence
Dyer (1987) Positive (negative) emotions involve the realization (thwarting) of goals
Izard (1991) Positive (negative) emotions are likely to have desirable (undesirable) consequences
Lazarus (1991) Positive (negative) emotions are beneficial (harmful) to social relationships
Bickhard (2000) Positive (negative) emotions diminish (augment) uncertainty
Rozin (2003) A positive (negative) state is one that we seek to enhance (get rid of)
Prinz (2004) A positive (negative) emotion is one that we want to sustain (get rid of)
Table 5. Teleological uses of valence and their relation to emotion valence
Valence as adaptive value-tagging
According to Panksepp (e.g. 1998; 2000; 2005, this volume), mammals share
seven basic subcortical and endocrine emotional systems that encode biological
values. These emotional systems are ‘valenced’ in the sense that they ‘value-tag’
objects and situations in the environment and thus regulate adaptive behaviours.
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For Panksepp every basic emotional system is valenced, in the sense that, in
order to guide behaviour, it attributes values to the world. Some emotional sys-
tems feel always bad (FEAR and PANIC), others feel always good (PLAY and CARE),
and others feel good or bad according to the situation (SEEKING, RAGE and LUST).
Valence and norms
Finally, sometimes valence is explicitly and primarily defined in relation to
norms and values. Picard (1997) thinks that an affective computer should have a
sense (either hard-wired or learned) for what is morally good and bad, and this is
how she defines valence (cf. p. 223). Also, scientists are becoming increasingly
interested in Buddhist conceptions of mind and emotion (cf. Davidson & Har-
rington, 2002; Goleman, 1997; 2003), and Buddhism explicitly moralizes emo-
tion. ‘Positive and negative emotions’ corresponds to a distinction between
‘virtuous’ and ‘non-virtuous’ mental factors (see Dreyfus, 2002, for an introduc-
tion to the concepts of mind and emotion in the Abidharma tradition). Negative
mental factors (anger, attachment) disturb the mind and should be avoided; emo-
tions such as loving-kindness and wishing well for other beings should be culti-
vated. This distinction is primarily ethical, but is at the same time intertwined
with the consideration that virtuous emotions improve one’s overall well-being,
whereas non-virtuous ones disrupt it. Positive, virtuous emotions are whole-
some, and negative, non-virtuous ones are unwholesome.
In line with this view, Davidson has investigated the health consequences of
what he calls ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ affective styles. A positive affective style
involves mainly ‘positive emotions’ — which for Davidson include positive
affect, social engagement and extroversion. A negative affective style involves a
predominance of ‘negative emotions’ — anxiety, depression, social disengage-
ment and introversion. Left-prefrontal activated individuals tend to have a posi-
tive affective style, whereas right-prefrontal activated individuals tend to have a
negative affective style. Davidson et al. (1999) have shown that, in addition,
‘positive’ left-activated individuals have more natural killer cells in their
immune system and are less likely to become sick, whereas prototypical ‘nega-
tive’ right-prefrontal activated individuals have less natural killer cells and are
more likely to become sick.
VI: Problems — Conflations and Dichotomies
The overview of different uses of ‘valence’ I have just offered is not exhaustive
(for more uses see Charland, 2005a; Prinz, 2004: 167-173; Solomon & Stone,
2002). Prinz and Solomon & Stone also mention various problems raised by dif-
ferent uses of the expression ‘positive and negative emotions.’
In my view, the problems raised by the uses of valence reviewed above can be
divided into two groups. First, there are problems of conflation deriving from the
tendency to switch back and forth between the valence sign of an emotion tout
court, and the valence sign of different aspects of emotion. Such conflations, as
we will see, induce excessive simplifications and overlook many familiar cases
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of emotion; because an emotion feels good, it does not follow that it is also itself
positive, or that it involves positive behaviour, positive facial expressions, posi-
tive evaluations, etc. There are then deeper and more challenging problems that
derive from the idea that emotion and its aspects can be dichotomized. Valence is
typically characterized in terms of mutually exclusive poles, which logically
rules out the possibility of mixtures. This characterization also oversimplifies
and overlooks daily lived emotions, but in a more fundamental and worrying
way. Whereas the first group of problems highlights a lack of clarity and agree-
ment when using ‘valence’ that could be solved with more explicitness, the sec-
ond group of problems calls into question the utility of the current notion of
valence as a descriptive and explanatory tool of emotion theory.
Conflations
Conflations arise when a positive (negative) emotion is taken to necessarily have
positive (negative) aspects. According to Davitz (1969), for example, positive
emotions involve positive direction of behaviour (‘moving toward’), positive
hedonic tone (‘comfort’), positive activation (‘activation’) and positive compe-
tence (‘enhancement’). Negative-1 emotions involve negative-1 behaviour
(‘away’), negative-1 hedonic tone (‘discomfort’), negative-1 activation
(‘hypoactivation’) and negative-1 competence (‘dissatisfaction’). Negative-2
emotions involve negative-2 behaviour (‘moving against’), negative-2 hedonic
tone (‘tension’), negative-2 activation (‘hyperactivation’) and negative-2 com-
petence (‘inadequacy’). Davitz presents this taxonomy as if it exhausted all emo-
tions. Yet one can find many examples of emotions that are not all positive, or
not all negative-1 or all negative-2. Before an examination for which you are not
very prepared, your state could be characterized by ‘toward,’ ‘discomfort’ and
‘inadequacy’; if I am determined to leave a job that I do not like, then my emo-
tion might be best characterized as involving ‘activation,’ ‘enhancement’ and
‘away from’; and so on.
Davidson also employs the tags ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ for several aspects of
emotion and for emotions themselves (e.g. Davidson, 1984, 1998, 2000;
Davidson et al., 1990). He uses ‘valence’ primarily as behaviour valence, and
maintains that approach depends on left prefrontal cortical regions whereas
withdrawal depends on right ones. From here, however, Davidson often leaps to
the claim that positive emotions tout court depend on the left hemisphere, and
that negative emotions depend on the right one. In other words, he tends to infer
the lateralization of emotion valence from the one of behaviour valence. This
tendency induces him, in turn, to lateralize affect valence: left-hemisphere posi-
tive emotions feel good, whereas right-hemisphere negative emotions feel bad.
He also mentions positive and negative facial expressions (e.g. Davidson, 1984),
and eventually groups all positive (negative) aspects of emotion into positive
(negative) personality traits dependent on left (right) hemispheric activation (the
‘affective styles’ mentioned above).
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Davidson’s view fits prima facie some of the classic emotions discussed in
emotion theory. Fear, for example, seems to have all the characteristics of right
hemispheric activation: it involves withdrawal, it feels bad, it is expressed by a
negative facial expression, and it is a paradigmatic negative emotion. Similarly
for contempt and sadness. Joy, on the other hand, seems to have all the character-
istics of left hemispheric activation: it involves approach, it feels good, it is
expressed by a positive facial expression, and it is a paradigmatic positive emo-
tion. Similarly for pride and enthusiasm. However, there are cases that, on
Davidson’s own admission, the model does not fit. A popular counterexample is
anger, which most theorists characterize as involving approach and unpleasant-
ness. Davidson (e.g. 1994) admits that his model does not fit contentment, and
post-attainment pleasant feelings in general, either. The upshot is that positive
(negative) affect is only contingently related to positive (negative) behaviour,
and to the general positive (negative) character of an emotion. Davidson’s model
does not fit all emotions conventionally discussed in emotion theory. Accord-
ingly, one’s affective style need not include either all positive or all negative
traits.
The take-away message so far is that an emotion and specific behaviours, feel-
ings, etc. need not together because they all have the same ‘valence sign.’ The
lesson then is that emotion theorists should keep track of, and make explicit, their
reasons for calling an emotion and/or its aspects ‘positive’ or ‘negative.’
But what about the assumption that it is appropriate to dichotomize emotions
and its aspects? This issue poses a more serious challenge to the current uses of
the notion of valence. The major problem with Davidson’s model, as I see it, is
that it is not obvious that emotions such as relief, schadenfreude, jealousy, envy,
contentment, etc. involve either approach or withdrawal, and always feel either
good or bad. Davitz’ distinction of the ‘negative’ part of valence into negative-1
and negative-2 does not make much progress, because it still assumes that an
emotion is either comforting, discomforting or tense; that it leads one toward,
away or against something; etc. In short, Davitz’ tripartition still leaves no room
for mixtures. I turn now to these challenging cases.
Dichotomies
The uses of valence reviewed above assume that different aspects of emotion can
be dichotomized, and that the two terms of the dichotomies are mutually exclu-
sive. ‘Less positive valence’ implies ‘more negative valence,’ which leaves no
room for mixtures (typically human, but not necessarily only).
The notion of object valence implies that objects are intrinsically attractive or
aversive, suitable or harmful. But attractiveness and aversiveness, and suitability
and harmfulness are relational properties. They depend both on the agent’s struc-
ture and concerns, as well as on the environment; the same object can be more or
less appealing to the same agent depending on the context. Development and
evolution make some objects more reliably attractive (aversive) than others. In
short, object valence is never absolute; many environmental settings are new and
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unusual, and agents have different developmental histories that relate them in
different ways to objects and situation (this can pose a problem for experimental
settings that assume the absolute positive and negative character of stimuli). The
more complex the agent, the more complex and layered its developmental
history and hence the significance of its objects.
Consider next the approach-withdrawal distinction, and compare approach in
love and approach in anger. The former can be understood as a movement ‘to-
ward’ the source of love, and the latter is better described as a movement
‘against’ the object of anger (see also Davitz, 1969). The latter is a reaction to
aversive stimulation, and the two senses of approach are very different. Consider
also the following example. I am angry at a certain person P (a colleague of mine,
say) because she has insulted me. Because I cannot punch her, I start gossiping
about her at work, until she is eventually fired. The ‘approach’ induced by my
anger consists in the exploitation of causal chains in order to have an effect on P,
and these causal chains involve withdrawal from P. Or consider the case in which
I seek someone’s help out of fear. It does not seem possible to account for these
cases with a simple bipolar dimension of behaviour whose extremes are
approach and withdrawal. Approach and withdrawal are such not simply because
of the direction of movement they involve (toward and away from, respectively).
As Lewin (1935) already noted, they are motivational categories tangled up with
shorter- and longer-term goals, intentions and desires. To characterize them as
‘opposites’ overlooks the fact that they often coexist, and strips them down to
‘directions of behaviour’ that, by themselves, cannot account for most of our
motivated behaviours.
As for affect valence, philosophers have often mentioned the possibility of
mixed feelings. Plato in the Philebus says that pleasures are rarely pure; most of
the time they are mixed, that is, they contain pain (in more or less measure).
While watching a comedy we feel malevolence – we laugh at the characters’ mis-
fortunes, and although we are amused, this enjoyment contains an understanding
of the characters’ suffering. We enjoy watching tragedies, but at the same time
we are overwhelmed with sorrow. Bodily feelings can themselves be admixtures
of pain and pleasure, as in the relief of scratching an itch. Prinz (2004, p. 165)
notices that nostalgia feels bad because one is missing something, but at the same
time involves a memory of how good it was to have that something. Or consider
the mixed feeling triggered by the news that your best friend has just been
offered the job you really wanted.
Psychologists usually do not discuss these cases and build their models out of
alleged ‘pure’ cases. Some of them explain away the ambivalent nature of mixed
feelings by reducing them to duck-rabbit-like attentional switches (e.g. Arnold,
1960). On this view, it is not the case that nostalgia feels bad and good at the
same time. Simply, when in nostalgia you pay attention to the absence of the
missed object, you feel bad; when you pay attention to how good it was to have
that something, you feel good. The two affects cannot be experienced at the same
time. A different view would allow true phenomenological mixtures, as in a
sweet-and-sour flavour. When I taste a sweet-and-sour dish, there is a sense in
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which I understand why the dish is called that way. However, I do not really
seem to be able to pay attention to the sourness in isolation from the sweetness,
and vice versa. Perhaps mixed feelings are sweet-and-sour-like, and this is
(among others) what early introspectionist studies on emotion experience were
trying to assess (cf. Beebe-Centre, 1932, for an overview).
If feelings are sweet-and-sour-like – that is, irreducible to duck-rabbit-like
experiences — bipolar unidimensional models of affect valence cannot account
for them, because they leave no room for mixtures. A more appropriate model
here could be Watson & Tellegen’s (1985), according to which positive affect
and negative affect are two independent dimensions. Pleasantness is character-
ized by low negative affect and high positive affect, and unpleasantness is char-
acterized by high negative affect and low positive affect. In this model, mixed
feelings could be characterized as containing, at the same time, high positive and
high negative affect (as perhaps in catharsis), or low positive and low negative
affect (as in mild nostalgia).
There are further complications. As Aristotle points out in the Nicomachean
Ethics, there are as many pleasures as there are pleasant activities (see also
Frijda, 1986; Kenny, 1963; Lambie & Marcel, 2000; Prinz, 2004; Solomon &
Stone, 2002). The pleasure one takes in, say, one’s friends’ company feels differ-
ent from the pleasure one has in eating one’s favourite food; and different
friends, as well as different foods, also induce different pleasures. Kenny (1963)
argues that pleasure is not a separate feeling that is added or subtracted from
activities, and that makes them pleasant or unpleasant accordingly. A pleasant
activity is not an activity plus a feeling of pleasure. Rather, actions are pleasant
or unpleasant; their peculiar pleasant feel depends on their object and, more gen-
erally, on the kind of activity they are. Similar considerations lead Lambie &
Marcel (2002) to propose a notion of multidimensional hedonic tone. In their
view, not only does every activity have its own hedonic tone; an activity might
include several hedonic experiences. This happens because hedonicity, in their
view, depends – at least in part – on how second-order attention is directed
towards first-order pleasures and pains. For example, it depends on whether
one’s attention is immersed in the object of emotion or in one’s experience (of
bodily states, for example); on whether one’s attention is more or less focused on
the details of the experience; on whether one can change one’s situation, etc.6
Finally, Charland’s (2005a) argument for the indeterminacy of affect valence
is particularly destabilizing. As we saw, he uses Lambie & Marcel’s view to
argue that affect valence is not an intrinsic property of emotion experience.
Rather, valence is constructed through the interplay of first-order (irreflexive)
phenomenology and attentional mechanisms directed to it. In this view, there is
nothing fixed corresponding to affect valence, nothing objective ‘already there’
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[6] Many mixed feelings are likely to depend on some kind of interaction between more basic and
irreflexive experiences, and higher-level reflexive ones (see Gennaro, 2000, for such an account of
catharsis), but we should not exclude that feelings can be mixed also at the irreflexive level — per-
haps as in mixed bodily feelings, such as the above-mentioned relief of scratching an itch (see Plato’s
Philebus for more examples).
that can be read out by second order attention. In other words, affect valence is an
evaluative feature of emotion experience dependent on (or even arising from)
second-order descriptions.7 Charland’s argument is destabilizing because it
undermines attempts to justify the dichotomous positive and negative character
of experience on the basis of how they ‘simply’ feel. How many poles or dimen-
sions feelings have is likely to depend on the tools we (and emotion scientists)
employ to investigate and report experiences.
Let us move on to ‘evaluation valence.’ We saw that, in the first place, there is
no agreement on what makes an evaluation positive or negative, nor how evalua-
tion valence relates to emotion valence. Second, it seems too simple to reduce
appraisals in an emotion to a single evaluative dimension. As Solomon & Stone
(2002) argue, ‘[v]irtually every emotion … involves a multiplicity of appraisals’
(p. 427), or what they call a ‘multidimensional appraisal’: appraisal of the situa-
tion, of oneself, moral appraisals, etc.; some of these appraisals may detect posi-
tive aspects of a situation, and others may detect negative aspects. In addition,
once again: we do not seem to evaluate something as, so to say, ‘good’ in amount
xg and therefore ‘bad’ in amount k-xg.’ To think that this is possible is to assume
that we evaluate things as ‘definitely good (bad)’ — not ‘perfectly good (bad)’
perhaps, but without anything bad (good) in it.
Whether a facial expression (or a component of it) can be appropriately
labelled ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ is complicated by difficulties with interpreting
faces in relation to emotion and experience, and by problems with the notion of
expression itself. This topic would require a paper on its own. For present pur-
poses it is sufficient to note that tagging a facial expression as either ‘positive’ or
‘negative’ usually relies on the following assumptions: (1) there is an underlying
experience that is either positive or negative; (2) the face expresses this experi-
ence, and it is possible to unequivocally read the experience from the face; (3)
the face is interpreted as the expression of an emotion by an observer. Every
assumption is problematic. First, as many theorists have pointed out, there is no
one-to-one relationship between experience and facial expression — between
‘feeling anger’ and ‘expression of anger,’ ‘feeling fear’ and ‘expression of fear,’
etc. (cf. Russell & Fernández-Dols, 1997). This suggests that what looks like a
positive (negative) expression may not necessarily reflect a pleasant (unpleas-
ant) feeling. Second, seeing an expression as the manifestation of an ‘inner’
emotional feeling is an interpretative act that can go wrong because of context
effects; indeed, there is evidence that context plays a role in the tagging of facial
expressions (Russell & Fehr, 1987; Fernández-Dols & Carroll, 1997). Third,
facial movements depend on several factors and not all of them ‘express emo-
tions.’ Fourth, it is possible to argue that, when it comes to emotion experience,
others’ interpretations of our expressive attempts shape our own experience (see
Campbell, 1997, for an externalist view of feeling). Finally, there is always the
problem that it is not evident that feelings are always either pleasant or unpleas-
ant. Interestingly, Ekman initially thought that people typically experience
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[7] Yet: ‘perhaps not all aspects of affect valence are equally permeable to attention, some may be rela-
tively fixed and modular’ (Charland, 2005a, p. 249).
blends of emotion, and that these show up on the face (Ekman, 1982). Ekman
(1972) observed that only posed expressions can be accurately defined as posi-
tive or negative; spontaneous expressions do not provide precise information in
this respect. More recently, Smith & Scott (1997) have noticed that
there is considerable evidence suggesting that it is rare for most individuals to expe-
rience strong feelings of a single isolated emotion. Instead, across a variety of emo-
tionally evocative contexts, it is common for individuals to report the subjective
experience of blends of up to four (or more) emotions. … Although there have been
attempts to describe the facial expressions characteristic of a limited number of
emotional blends, … the principles by which such blended expressions are pro-
duced have not yet been articulated. (p.235)
This passage shows nicely how the assumption that an emotion experience can
be easily dichotomized influences scientific methodology. Theorists divide
faces into positive and negative, and design experiments based on this idea,
excluding a priori more complex possibilities.
When valence is used teleologically, the positive and negative character of an
emotion is defined in relation to the consequences of one’s actions with respect
to one’s goals, needs or desires. As we saw, for some theorists positive (negative)
emotions are caused by the attainment (thwarting) of goals, or by certainty
(uncertainty) about the future. This approach is limited, as clearly not all emo-
tions depend on attainment or thwarting of goals and desires; often we simply
enjoy, or dislike, certain activities, and are anxious, depressed or jolly irrespec-
tive of our aims. Emotions such as contentment do not seem to depend on the
expectation that uncertainty will be reduced; sometimes we enjoy the thrill of the
unknown. For other theorists, positive (negative) emotions somehow involve the
desire/goal to continue (stop) a certain activity. This is, I think, an interesting
definition of pleasure and displeasure. Yet one can still ask to what extent plea-
sures involve the desire to continue; we do not want to indulge in all pleasures for
the same time, or for a very long time (the expectation of how long a pleasure
will last seems to influence the pleasure one feels). I also wonder whether
extreme pleasures are pure, and whether one always wants to continue them (the
hedonic character of sadomasochistic feelings is an interesting case in this
respect). If Plato is right and most of our pleasures contain pain, then often we
will be in a situation where we want more and, at the same time, less of it. The
bottom question is whether this ambivalent state can be appropriately reduced to
the activity of two somewhat ‘opposite’ systems (e.g. reward and punishment,
approach and withdrawal) that support separate phenomenological states (plea-
sure and displeasure), or rather is a real experiential mixture that depends on the
integration (perhaps a dynamical coupling) of these systems.
Panksepp’s use of ‘valence’ does not seem to pose particular problems if
understood as ‘value-tagging power’ (this use is close to the etymology of ‘va-
lence’). Yet Panksepp also accepts the idea that some emotional systems feel
intrinsically good or bad. For example, CARE always feels good. This is a simpli-
fication that overlooks the variety of possible cases of care; it is hard to charac-
terize the feeling of taking care of a loved one who is terminally ill as good or
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bad, or even as a duck-rabbit-like state. Perhaps Panksepp would reply that more
than one emotional system is at play here (CARE and FEAR, for example), which
could explain the mixed hedonic tone. This possibility is interesting, but needs
more analysis and discussion; once again, the hard problem is how two separate
neural mechanisms can support a phenomenological mixture.
Finally, the explicitly normative characterization of valence raises complica-
tions of its own. One can mention several reasons why one should or should not
have an emotion. For a consequentialist, an emotion is morally good if it brings
about good consequences; despite the simple formulation, what makes a conse-
quence ‘good’ is itself a complex issue, as moral philosophers know. There are
also psychological and holistic reasons that make the normative connotation of
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ relative to the context. Take the common case of vic-
tims of abuse who feel guilty about it. In this context the transformation of guilt
into anger might be seen as a positive event. This does not mean that a victim of
abuse should feel angry forever; the point is only that, within the context of cer-
tain therapeutic practices, anger can be an emotion that one should at some point
cultivate. Consider also how a holistic view of personality can justify tradition-
ally irredeemable and sinful emotions. Goldie (2000) argues — convincingly I
think – that character traits like jealousy are intertwined with other traits in such
a way that one cannot just take the jealousy away from a person and obtain the
same person in an ‘ameliorated version.’ Character is not a patchwork of sepa-
rate emotional dispositions, and we cannot simply cross out the ones we do not
like while remaining ‘the same person.’ It thus becomes possible to argue that
jealousy, within the whole economy of one’s character, is something one does
not necessarily want to get rid of.
In addition, what exactly does it mean that one ought, or ought not, to have a
certain emotion? Does it mean that one should not express it, or not feel it? In
other words, what aspect of the emotion is in question? It is an old moral issue
whether it is enough, for sinning, to feel a certain emotion (such as lust, greed,
pride, etc.), or whether the sin consists in allowing oneself to take certain actions
to indulge in it. Does virtue consist in the absence of sinful feelings, or in the
fight against them? These questions relate to issues of mental health as well.
What is ‘negative’ in a psychiatric condition, for example? To feel a certain emo-
tion? Or to not be able to deal with it? Or not to be able to prevent certain behav-
iours instigated by it? According to the answer, the therapy is likely to be
different. The upshot, for present purposes, is that there are several reasons why
one should or should not have (or feel, or express) an emotion.
VII: Concluding Remarks
Summing up, we saw that the notion of valence does not originally and etymo-
logically refer to a positive-negative distinction. Since its introduction in psy-
chology (via a tentative and questionable translation) and then specifically in
emotion theory, ‘valence’ has been linked to the tags ‘positive’ and ‘negative’
with increasing frequency. More or less inadvertently, it has been used to refer to
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different aspects of emotion. At present, the ideas that there are positive and neg-
ative emotions, that emotions have positive and negative aspects, and that emo-
tion is valenced all support one another and are interchangeable. This process of
regimentation hides many problems. One is that ‘valence’ often implicitly means
many different things; I have tackled this problem by disentangling its meanings.
Another problem is that these different meanings tend to be conflated; I have
shown in which sense, and claimed that this need not happen. A further, deep
problem depends on the dichotomous character of valence, which brings with it
the idea that emotion and/or its aspects can be divided into mutually exclusive
opposites; I have argued that this notion of valence (and all that comes with it) is
too simple.
Whence the allure of valence? Affect valence plays an important role in sup-
porting other uses of valence; what makes something ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ in
an emotion often comes down, more or less explicitly, to how that something
feels. Yet it is naïve to think that affect valence can have the last word and be the
brute fact on which to build an objectively dichotomous notion of emotion. The
notion of positive or negative experience has normativity built within — it stipu-
lates that some feelings are ‘good’ and others are ‘bad’ (in this sense, the
‘moralizations of valence’ illustrated at the end of section V are not the only nor-
mative accounts of valence). Charland’s (2005a) view that affect valence is
influenced by second-order attentional processes and is thus indeterminate
implies that how good or bad our affects feel depends on our values; in short, we
feel through our values (this I think is the idea that emotions, thanks to feelings,
are ‘normative windows to the world’; see Charland, 2005b, this volume).
There might be pragmatic reasons to keep the dichotomous notion of valence.
It is evident that ‘positivity’ and ‘negativity’ are relative to the context; for
example, a behaviour of withdrawal might be called ‘negative’ for some reason,
but it might be adaptive or socially beneficial and hence ‘positive’ in some other
sense (see Solomon & Stone, 2002, for more examples). In the first part of sec-
tion VI I have argued that the relativity of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ does not
allow one to switch back and forth between the valence sign of an emotion and
the valence sign of its aspects — there is no necessity for different aspects of
emotion to go together (as in the idea that approach is necessarily pleasant)
because they have the same ‘valence sign’. Yet one could still hold that in a cer-
tain context it is useful to distinguish positive and negative aspects of emotion; if
the context in which the notion of valence appears is clear, the definition of
valence explicit, and the relativity of the labels acknowledged, then there should
be no problem in using ‘positive’ and ‘negative’.
I mistrust this pragmatic stance. All things considered (section VI), I believe
that when it comes to defining and characterizing emotion, the dichotomous
notion of valence is a hindrance rather than a useful tool. I find that, in practice,
most emotion theorists often keep an ironic distance from the dichotomous char-
acter of valence (and associated claims) and acknowledge that ‘things in reality
are more complicated than that’; yet, at the same time, they seem to accept the
dichotomous character of valence and associated claims as an inevitable status
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quo. My suspicion is that if reality really is more complicated than that, prag-
matic irony will at some point have to yield. The view that we can call an emotion
and/or its aspect ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ at least for certain purposes has a dan-
gerous appeal, because that distinction always simplifies and distorts the normal
level of complexity, no matter how carefully and ironically it is employed. Also,
it reinforces and validates other simplistic descriptions. It induces one to catego-
rize, isolate and circumscribe what are complex and integrated phenomena, and
to overlook their temporal developments (with fluctuations in affect, behavioral
dispositions, expression, evaluations, etc.).
This descriptive style is too distant from daily lived emotions, and I think this
should not and need not be so. My worry is that a tool that is too simple will
induce one to overlook complexity, even when one would like to acknowledge it.
For example, emotion scientists have extensively investigated ‘basic emotions,’
and when it comes to ‘more complex ones,’ things tend to be kept quite simple
anyway. Guilt, shame, jealousy, etc. are described as typical, univocal, discrete
and static phenomena, different from other phenomena such as e.g. moods, and
non-emotional states altogether (but see Ratcliffe, 2005, this volume, for a dif-
ferent view). Dimensional models generally oppose the discrete emotion
approach, yet they also tend to downgrade mixtures and complexities to
borderline non-prototypical cases.
The difficult question, for those who believe in the possibility of a science of
emotion, is: can the dichotomous notion of valence be maintained ‘at bottom’
and then be somewhat complexified when and if needed? In other words, can it
outlast the acknowledgement of the complexities discussed above? The dilemma
is evident in Solomon & Stone (2002), who announce: ‘our argument is not that
there is no such thing as valence or no such polarity or contrasts, but rather that
there are many such polarities and contrasts’ (p. 418), yet recognize: ‘opposites
depend on polarity, and polarity is just what is not available in even the simplest
emotions … the game of opposites has obviously become quite pointless’
(p. 433, my italics), and eventually reach the compromise that emotion research
should not ‘dispense with such distinctions’ and yet be more attentive to the
phenomenological richness of emotion (ibid.). Can this be achieved, and how?
Here I can only hand-wave at issues that still need to be addressed and clari-
fied, and at my own preferred style of investigation. We saw that some authors
(including Solomon & Stone) call for ‘multidimensional approaches.’ This is an
interesting strategy, but it needs to be clarified and spelled out in more detail to
be assessed. For example: Does Lambie & Marcel’s (2002) notion of ‘multidi-
mensional hedonic tone’ eventually dispense with the bipolar pleasant-
ness-unpleasantness dimension, or can it keep it and somehow build on it? This
takes us back to Charland’s (2005a) argument: if affect valence is indeterminate,
then that dimension is entirely normative and depends entirely on how
higher-order level attention turns its gaze to it. Similarly, what becomes of Rus-
sell’s pleasantness-unpleasantness dimension once one admits that higher-order
levels of attention modify and subsume it (cf. Russell, 2003; 2005, this
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volume)8? Perhaps Varela & Depraz (2005, this volume) are right that valence is
a basic organismic disposition. But what exactly do they mean when they claim
that ‘[i]n the case of humans … it is … possible to point to a multiplicity of
valences’ (p. 77, my italics)? How do evolution and development impinge on
that basic disposition? Does it outlast the added integration and complexity? In
short, what happens to it ‘at the fold’?
My preference is real complexification which, as I see it, is not affiliated with
a divide-and-conquer strategy that is confident that starting from pure, simple
cases can explain the complicated and mixed ones. What is at stake is the variety
and richness of our experiences, including the liberty to be uniquely and origi-
nally personal (see Campbell’s account of ‘free-style feelings’; Campbell,
1997). Some theorists seem resigned that emotion theory will, or even should,
leave us with a gap between science and daily lived emotions (see Charland,
2005b, this volume). My preference is to try to respect complexity on both sides:
in phenomenological descriptions, and in accounts of underlying mechanisms.
What use can we make of a science whose conceptual tools fail to capture impor-
tant features of the phenomena it is meant to describe and explain? I think that, if
we want science to ‘eventually hold its ground in the experimental “tribunal of
experience”’ (ibid., p. 96) we should take complexity seriously rather than ironi-
cally, and acknowledge it by default.9
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